Contribution ID: b4df6ca2-79b6-4a44-bb0d-7da73c35855e

Date: 06/08/2021 12:47:22

Fighting the use of shell entities and arrangements for tax purposes

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

1

Introduction

Several actions taken by the EU over recent years have provided new powerful instruments to tax administrations to tackle the use of abusive (often purely artificial) and aggressive tax structures by taxpayers operating cross-border to reduce their tax liability. However, even after these important developments, legal entities with no or only minimal substance, performing no or very little economic activity continue to pose a risk of being used in aggressive tax planning structures. Such risks of misuse expand to legal arrangements. This is possible because, while substance of legal entities is addressed by the Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation within the context of specific preferential tax regimes, there are no EU legislative measures which define substance requirements for tax purposes to be met by entities within the EU. Recent investigations conducted by a consortium of journalists brought the issue again to the attention of the general public with a more pressing request to act at EU level to end this practice.

The issue at stake is the use of legal entities with no or minimum substance and no real economic activities, by taxpayers operating cross-border to reduce their tax liability. While entities with no substance and no real economic activities can be used for different abusive purposes (including for criminal ones, e.g. money laundering, terrorist financing, etc.), this initiative would focus on situations where the ultimate objective is to minimise the overall taxation of a group or of a given structure. The European Commission has received several complaints and requests for action from the European Parliament, from citizens, NGOs, journalists and the civil society in general.

In line with Better Regulation principles, the Commission has decided to launch a public consultation designed to gather stakeholders' views on the possible improvements to the EU legal framework in this field.

Responding to the full questionnaire should take about 30 minutes. The questionnaire aims to capture views from all stakeholders on the use and misuse of shell entities and arrangements in the EU for tax purposes. Stakeholders' responses will help the Commission determine if an EU initiative to target shell entities and their misuse for tax purposes is needed as well as its most appropriate design features. The replies will also help identify the main risks as perceived by stakeholders, as well as the priorities for policy actions.

2 About you

Czech
Danish
Dutch
English
Estonian
Finnish
French
German
Greek
Hungarian
Irish
Italian
Latvian
Lithuanian
Maltese
Polish
Portuguese
Romanian
Slovak
Slovenian
Spanish
Swedish
*2.2 I am giving my contribution as
Academic/research institution
Business association
Company/business organisation
Consumer organisation
EU citizen
Environmental organisation
Non-EU citizen

*2.1 Language of my contribution

Bulgarian

Croatian

Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
Public authority
Trade union
Other
*2.4 First name
Bob
DOD
*2.5 Surname
van der Made
*2.6 Email (this won't be published)
bob.vandermade@pwc.com
*2.10 Organisation name
255 character(s) maximum
European Business Initiative on Taxation (EBIT)
*2.11 Organisation size
Micro (1 to 9 employees)
Small (10 to 49 employees)
Medium (50 to 249 employees)
Large (250 or more)
2.12 Transparency register number
255 character(s) maximum Check if your organisation is on the transparency register. It's a voluntary database for organisations seeking to
influence EU decision-making.
26231733692-35
*2.13 Country of origin
Please add your country of origin, or that of your organisation.
Afghanistan Djibouti Libya Saint Martin
Åland Islands Dominica Liechtenstein Saint Pierre and Miquelon

	Albania	0	Dominican	0	Lithuania	Saint Vincent
			Republic			and the
						Grenadines
	Algeria		Ecuador		Luxembourg	Samoa
	American Samoa		Egypt		Macau	San Marino
	Andorra		El Salvador		Madagascar	São Tomé and
						Príncipe
	Angola		Equatorial Guinea	a [©]	Malawi	Saudi Arabia
0	Anguilla		Eritrea		Malaysia	Senegal
0	Antarctica		Estonia		Maldives	Serbia
	Antigua and		Eswatini		Mali	Seychelles
	Barbuda					
	Argentina		Ethiopia		Malta	Sierra Leone
0	Armenia		Falkland Islands		Marshall Islands	Singapore
	Aruba		Faroe Islands	0	Martinique	Sint Maarten
	Australia		Fiji		Mauritania	Slovakia
	Austria		Finland	0	Mauritius	Slovenia
	Azerbaijan		France		Mayotte	Solomon Islands
0	Bahamas		French Guiana	0	Mexico	Somalia
	Bahrain		French Polynesia		Micronesia	South Africa
	Bangladesh		French Southern		Moldova	South Georgia
			and Antarctic			and the South
			Lands			Sandwich
						Islands
	Barbados		Gabon		Monaco	South Korea
	Belarus	0	Georgia		Mongolia	South Sudan
0	Belgium	0	Germany		Montenegro	Spain
	Belize		Ghana		Montserrat	Sri Lanka
	Benin		Gibraltar		Morocco	Sudan
0	Bermuda		Greece		Mozambique	Suriname
	Bhutan		Greenland		Myanmar/Burma	Svalbard and
						Jan Mayen
	Bolivia		Grenada		Namibia	Sweden

	Bonaire Saint Eustatius and Saba	0	Guadeloupe		Nauru	0	Switzerland
0	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	Guam	0	Nepal	0	Syria
0	Botswana		Guatemala	0	Netherlands	0	Taiwan
0	Bouvet Island	0	Guernsey	0	New Caledonia	0	Tajikistan
0	Brazil		Guinea	0	New Zealand	0	Tanzania
0	British Indian Ocean Territory	0	Guinea-Bissau	0	Nicaragua	0	Thailand
0	British Virgin Islands	0	Guyana	0	Niger	0	The Gambia
0	Brunei		Haiti		Nigeria	0	Timor-Leste
0	Bulgaria		Heard Island and		Niue	0	Togo
			McDonald Islands	3			
0	Burkina Faso		Honduras		Norfolk Island	0	Tokelau
0	Burundi		Hong Kong	0	Northern	0	Tonga
					Mariana Islands		
0	Cambodia		Hungary	0	North Korea	0	Trinidad and
							Tobago
0	Cameroon		Iceland	0	North Macedonia	0	Tunisia
0	Canada		India	0	Norway	0	Turkey
	Cape Verde		Indonesia	0	Oman	0	Turkmenistan
0	Cayman Islands		Iran	0	Pakistan	0	Turks and
							Caicos Islands
0	Central African		Iraq		Palau	0	Tuvalu
	Republic						
0	Chad		Ireland		Palestine	0	Uganda
0	Chile		Isle of Man	0	Panama	0	Ukraine
0	China		Israel		Papua New	0	United Arab
					Guinea		Emirates
0	Christmas Island		Italy		Paraguay	0	United Kingdom
	Clipperton		Jamaica	0	Peru	0	United States

	Cocos (Keeling)	Japan	Philippines	0	United States
	Islands				Minor Outlying
				_	Islands
0	Colombia	Jersey	Pitcairn Islands	0	Uruguay
0	Comoros	Jordan	Poland	0	US Virgin Islands
0	Congo	Kazakhstan	Portugal	0	Uzbekistan
0	Cook Islands	Kenya	Puerto Rico	0	Vanuatu
0	Costa Rica	Kiribati	Qatar	0	Vatican City
0	Côte d'Ivoire	Kosovo	Réunion	0	Venezuela
0	Croatia	Kuwait	Romania	0	Vietnam
0	Cuba	Kyrgyzstan	Russia	0	Wallis and
					Futuna
0	Curaçao	Laos	Rwanda	0	Western Sahara
0	Cyprus	Latvia	Saint Barthélemy	0	Yemen
0	Czechia	Lebanon	Saint Helena	0	Zambia
			Ascension and		
			Tristan da Cunha		
0	Democratic	Lesotho	Saint Kitts and		Zimbabwe
	Republic of the		Nevis		
	Congo				
0	Denmark	Liberia	Saint Lucia		

The Commission will publish all contributions to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would prefer to have your details published or to remain anonymous when your contribution is published. Fo r the purpose of transparency, the type of respondent (for example, 'business association, 'consumer association', 'EU citizen') country of origin, organisation name and size, and its transparency register number, are always published. Your e-mail address will never be published. Opt in to select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected

*2.15 Contribution publication privacy settings

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

Anonymous

Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

Public

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

I agree with the personal data protection provisions

3 Problem definition, policy options and impacts

3.1 Despite the recent introduction of new measures against tax avoidance in the EU, tax avoidance seems to remain a problem. Please consider the **relevance of the following possible causes.**

	very relevant	relevant	neither irrelevant nor relevant	not relevant	not relevant at all	no opinion
Inadequate legislation on tax avoidance	0	0	0	0	0	•
Insufficient information of tax administration on potential tax avoidance structures	©	0	0	0	0	•
Insufficient capacity of tax administration to process the available information on tax avoidance structures	0	0	0	0	•	•
Insufficient cooperation between EU Member States	0	0	0	0	0	•
Insufficient enforcement of existing legislation in Member States	0	0	0	0	0	•

- 3.2 The **EU toolbox to fight tax avoidance** has been recently enhanced and new tools came into effect from 2019 and 2020. With which of the following statements do you agree?
 - The impact of the new measures is not quantifiable yet. The EU should wait before taking new measures to fight tax avoidance until the impact of the existing measures is measurable.
 - While the impact of the new measures is not quantifiable yet, there is margin for improvement. The EU should take action to complement the existing framework as soon as possible.
- 3.3 "Shell" or "letterbox" entities is a term often used in the tax area to describe **e** ntities with little or no substance in their place of establishment or elsewhere. Do you agree with this definition?

yes

o no

3.4 Please explain your reply.

The importance of a shell entity for the group structure is not defined by substance and we refer to our commentary in 3.8 which explains the commercial rationale for shell entities in more detail.

3.5 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
Shell entities are used in the EU mostly for abusive tax purposes.	0	0	0	•	0	0
Current EU rules in the field of taxation already provide tools to tackle aggressive tax planning schemes including through the use of shell entities.	•	0	•	•	•	•
Current EU rules cannot fully and effectively address the use of shell entities for tax avoidance purposes.	0	0	0	•	0	0

While the EU legal framework includes adequate rules to address the use of shell entities for tax purposes, they are not properly implemented and monitored	•	•	•	•	•	•
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3.6 Can you provide examples of how shell entities are or can be used in an	
abusive manner for tax purposes?	

3.7 In your opinion, to what extent the following elements could indicate that a certain entity could be considered a shell entity for tax planning purposes? Please select one value for each element.

	Very indicative	Indicative	Neither indicative nor not indicative	Not indicative	Not indicative at all	No opinion
Use of trust and company service providers	0	0	•	0	0	0
Low number of employees	0	0	•	0	0	0
Lack of own premises	0	0	•	0	0	0
Lack of own bank account	0	0	•	0	0	0
Passive income as main source of income (rents, interests, royalties etc.)	0	0	•	0	0	0
Outsourcing of income generating activities	0	0	•	0	0	0
Mostly foreign sourced turnover	0	0	•	0	0	0
Majority of directors non-resident	0	0	•	0	0	0

3.8 Can you indicate commercial rationales that justify the establishment and operation of shell entities?

Can you provide concrete examples?

Rather than focus on an entity by entity basis, for a MNE, the whole presence in a particular territory should be considered e.g. often activities are divided within separate entities within the same country for commercial, legal, historic or other reasons. The substance/activities conducted as a whole in a country by an MNE should be considered. This is more appropriate for international groups. Nevertheless, such a test would only serve the purpose of demonstrating the total presence and activities of an MNE in a certain jurisdiction. The income of the distinct group enterprises would of course be determined on the basis of the separate entity approach and the arm's length principle.

A real-world example from the asset management sector of a commercial rationale that justifies the establishment and operation of shell entities is provided by one of EBIT's Members in the additional comments to the questionnaire submitted by EBIT to the European Commission (document uploaded via section 4. Final Remarks in this questionnaire below). NB: not all EBIT Members are asset management businesses: EBIT spans 16 different business sectors.

MNEs may choose to incorporate shell companies for commercial purposes with no tax advantage, for example, as local holding companies for entities carrying on regulated/restricted activities, to facilitate corporate transactions such as demergers. Groups may also hold shell companies that historically had more extensive activities which declined/ceased and which cannot easily be eliminated for commercial reasons.

3.9 Which of the following business activity do you consider most likely to be
performed by shell entities for tax purposes? You can indicate several replies.
Banking activities

- Insurance activitiesFinancing/leasing activitiesHolding and managing equity
- Holding and managing real estate
- Holding and managing IP assets
- Headquarters services
- Investment Fund Management
- Shipping
- Off-balance structures

3.10 Please provide examples of any other business activity you consider likely to be performed by shell entities for tax purposes. Please consider for instance situations where a company receives types of income not related to its main business activity (e.g. interests, royalties etc. received by logistics or sales companies).

3.11 Which of the following legal forms do you consider likely to be used to create or operate shell entities that will be used for tax purposes? You can indicate several replies. Companies Partnerships with legal personality Partnerships without legal personality Foundations Trusts or fiduciary Other
3.12 Please explain your response to the previous question and provide examples.
3.13 While Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) can also be or make use of shell entities for tax avoidance purposes, an initiative targeting shell entities could risk to put a burden on genuine small business.
For a future intervention, which of the following options would you consider most appropriate to alleviate any negative spill-overs to SMEs?
Use thresholds (e.g. on turnover or income) to exclude SMEs from the scope of such initiative
Include SMEs within the scope of such initiative only to the extent they perform mobile activities
No need for specific rules for SMEs Other
3.15 In a scenario where an entity is found not to have substantial economic activity (e.g. because it has some of the features indicated under Q.3.6) in the Member State of residence, in your view, what would be the most appropriate consequences?
You can tick more than one reply Denial of any tax advantages/benefits (e.g. relief from double taxation, deductibility of costs, application of of tax treaty benefits) for the entity

Denial of any tax advantages for the group of entities to which the shell entity belongs
Increased audit risk
Making data on the shell entities public (e.g. list of shell entities)
Monetary sanctions on the entity
Monetary or other sanctions on the directors
Monetary or other sanctions on the beneficiaries
Consequences to be determined by Member States as they deem fit
Other
3.16 Please elaborate.
Consequences to be determined in line with relevant existing /applicable EU and domestic law provisions.
The policy aim should be to avoid non-taxation rather than enforce double taxation. Most investment structures exist to mitigate double taxation, whether through tax at the investor level or at the investment level. Non-taxation is often a government policy e.g. for pension schemes, charities, SWFs etc, and so the regime should be aiming for tax neutrality.
3.17 The use of shell entities for tax avoidance purposes can have impacts. In your
view which ones are the most relevant impacts?
You can tick more than one reply.
Member States do not have the necessary resources to implement public policies
Tax burden is distributed unfairly within the society, at the expense of compliant and/or low income taxpayers.
Unfair competitive disadvantage to tax compliant entities
Unfair competitive disadvantage to SMEs that have less access to cross- border tax avoidance structures
Other impact
No opinion
3.18 Please elaborate.
Should not be an issue as long as it is not an artificial construction.
3.19 Are you aware of any existing national rules targeting specifically the use of

shell entities for tax purposes? Please provide reference.

_	$C \vdash C$	rules	in	а	hroad	Sense

- GAAR rules in some countries.
- Other measures being introduced e.g. Principal Purpose Test in tax treaties

UK diverted profits tax

- Measures to curb dormant entities used as flow-through entities (e.g. The Netherlands)
- In addition, there are a plethora of legislative provisions that include shell companies within their scope, including BEPS Action 6, the Multilateral Instrument and the domestic transposition of ATAD.

3.20 Coordination at EU level, e.g. on what qualifies as shell entity for tax
purposes and how should be treated in terms of taxation, is fundamental to tackle
the problem of shell entities in the internal market.

ourposes and how should be treated in terms of taxation, is fundamental to tackle the problem of shell entities in the internal market.
How much do you agree with this statement?
0
3.21 Please provide other reasons for which you consider that the EU should take action to enhance the fight against tax avoidance through the use of shell entities.
3.22 Please provide other reasons for which you consider that the EU should <u>not</u>
take action to enhance the fight against tax avoidance through the use of shell entities.
The impact of the existing other measures should first be known and analysed before well targeted and precise measures are taken; not using a (very broad) measure to tackle a detailed issue.
3.23 If the EU took new action targeted at the use of shell entities for tax avoidance purposes, which of the following objectives should be pursued in

priority?

You can tick more than one reply.

Provide more incentives for voluntary tax compliance to taxpayers akin to use
shell entities.
Promote effective implementation and enforcement of the existing anti-tax
avoidance tools.
Ensure coordination of all Member States on what qualifies as shell entity for
tax purposes and how it should be treated in terms of taxation.
Promote transparency on shell entities across the FU.

Monitor the implementation by Member States of any new EU rules targeted a shell entities.
All of the above
Other
3.24 Please indicate other objectives that should be pursued.
25 Places provide here any comments regarding your response to the provious
3.25 Please provide here any comments regarding your response to the previous question and available examples.
3.26 If the EU took new action to target the use of shell entities for tax avoidance
ourposes, which of the following means do you consider most likely to be effective? New EU action should be primarily of soft law nature so as to take into account the specific circumstances of each case and the situation of each Member State.
New EU action should be of hard law nature, i.e. a new EU Directive. This would ensure the necessary level of coordination in the EU to effectively tackle the problem.
3.27 Please describe any other means or combination thereof that the Commission should consider for EU action in this field.
3.28 If the EU took no further action in the short-term to target the use of shell entities for tax avoidance purposes, which of the following scenarios do you consider most likely?
Member States are keen to implement the existing tools against shell entities. In a few years they will have gained the necessary experience to tackle the problem themselves.
Without EU action targeted at shell entities, the problem will remain.

3.29 If new requirements were imposed on EU taxpayers and tax administrations
to tackle the use of shell entities for tax avoidance purposes, what would be the ${\bf mai}$
n economic impact in your view?
You can tick more than one reply.
Tax collection across the EU would increase.
Resource allocation across the EU would be optimised through better
distribution of tax burden.
Competitiveness of the internal market would increase.
Competitiveness of individual companies would increase.
Shell entities would be moved and set up outside the EU to maintain tax
avoidance structures.
3.30 Please describe any further major impacts you consider likely to arise from a
new EU action against shell entities, towards the above stakeholders (taxpayers,
tax administrations etc.) or other.
3.31 If new monitoring mechanisms were envisaged to check Member States'
3.31 If new monitoring mechanisms were envisaged to check Member States' implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the mai
implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the mai
implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the mai n consequence in your view?
implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the mai n consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main normal consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules.
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main normal consequence in your view? ✓ A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. ✓ Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice.
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main normal consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main not consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance.
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance. You can tick more than one reply.
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main consequence in your view? ✓ A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. ✓ Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance. You can tick more than one reply. ✓ Peer review mechanism, e.g. in the context of Code of Conduct Group on
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance. You can tick more than one reply. Peer review mechanism, e.g. in the context of Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main n consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance. You can tick more than one reply. Peer review mechanism, e.g. in the context of Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation Regular publication of anonymized data on compliance of entities in each
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main n consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance. You can tick more than one reply. Peer review mechanism, e.g. in the context of Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation Regular publication of anonymized data on compliance of entities in each Member State and on enforcement actions (audits performed, sanctions
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main n consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance. You can tick more than one reply. Peer review mechanism, e.g. in the context of Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation Regular publication of anonymized data on compliance of entities in each Member State and on enforcement actions (audits performed, sanctions imposed)
 implementation of tax avoidance rules against shell entities, what would be the main n consequence in your view? A level playing field would be encouraged. Member States would have more incentives to implement effectively the rules. Member States would face a new burden, while instead they should be free to implement the rules as best fits with their legislation and practice. 3.32 Please select which of the following you would consider to be an effective monitoring system as regards Member States' implementation of EU rules to fight tax avoidance. You can tick more than one reply. Peer review mechanism, e.g. in the context of Code of Conduct Group on Business Taxation Regular publication of anonymized data on compliance of entities in each Member State and on enforcement actions (audits performed, sanctions

Other

4 Final remarks

Although not necessary, you can upload a brief document, such as a position paper in case you think additional background information is needed to better explain your position or to share information about data, studies, papers etc. that the European Commission could consider to prepare its initiative.

Please note that the uploaded document will be published alongside your response to the questionnaire, which is the essential input to this public consultation. The document is optional complement serves as additional background reading to understand your position better.

In case you have chosen in the section "About you" that your contribution shall remain anonymous, please make sure you remove any personal information (name, email) from the document and also from the document properties.

4.1 Please upload your file

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

d4da6dc8-52a7-430f-ad08-2229a3656a9a /Additional_comments_to_the_EBIT_response_to_the_EC_Questionnaire_on_shell_companies_-_August_2021.pdf

Contact

Contact Form